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What follows is a two-part review of Günther Witzany’s two-part book, 
The Logos of the Bios (2006, 20073). The first part of the review is 
written by Sergey Chebanov, and it approaches the text as a source of 
ideas on biosemiotics and biohermeneutics. The second part is written 
by Anton Markoš, and it estimates the biological pithiness of the book 




On biocommunications and biocommunion 
 
If new directions of thinking are marked by the occurrence of separate 
articles and their collections, a sign of the transformation of such 
directions into a high-grade discipline is the publication of books. I 
have already written about the appearance of the first monograph on 
biosemiotics (Chebanov 1998). For the last decade, the publication of 
monographs on biosemiotics was a very rare event. The work reviewed 
here is even more uncommon. 
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As well as the previous book by the author (LB1), this is not a 
monograph in a strict sense, but a unified collection of articles 
published earlier, each of which develops the holistic plan of the 
author. Therefore it is perceived as a systematic presentation of the 
author’s version of biosemiotics, quite comparable to a monograph. 
As LB1 and LB2 are two parts of an integral composition, the parity 
of their subjects is clear too — the first book develops the general 
principles of the author’s approach and the second one deals with their 
application to different biological material. 
The essence of the author’s approach consists in considering 
“change from a viewpoint of purely mechanistic biology to a viewpoint 
of a linguistic, semiotics, communicative biology” (LB2: 8; compare 
LB2: 203). It is determined that processes involving DNA are de-
scribed by means of such linguistic categories as coding, copying, 
translation, transcription, etc. (LB2: 7).  
The basis for both of the books is the statement introduced in 1938 
by Charles Morris about the three dimensionality of semiosis — the 
levels of semantics, syntactics and the pragmatics are necessary for the 
study of sign-mediated interactions (the subtitle of LB1 is Contribu-
tions to the Foundation of Three-Leveled Biosemiotics; however it is the 
connection of these categories with Heidegger-Gadamer hermeneutics 
that is important for Günther Witzany). 
But perhaps the brightest idea of the author is that the living being 
is regulated by semiotic rules (LB2: 13, 15–17, 183) which grow out of 
some natural or cultural convention4 (LB2: 10), instead of natural laws 
(LB2: 13, 203 and the section From Umwelt to Mitwelt5 — LB2: 207–
226).  
Moreover, the author comes to the conclusion that cells, tissues, 
organs, organisms, etc. require the existence of communicative pro-
cesses as the interactions mediated by signs are regulated by specified 
                                                 
4   Usually this statement is considered to be the basic principle of semiotics. 
However, the reviewer supports a different view on semiotics. 
5   Terms by J. von Uexküll who is considered as one of the predecessors of 
biosemiotics (e.g., Uexküll 1909).  
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semiotic rules (LB2: 203, 227). Thus it appears that such interactions 
are not formalized and non-algorithmized (LB2: 203, 227) because it is 
the interactions that allow the existence of non-formalizable rules of 
content-generation (LB2: 231). 
I believe that this idea about the existence of algorithmized and 
non-algorithmized semiotic rules is the most significant achievement 
of the author, and that it has very important consequences. 
In my opinion, this idea may serve as the basis for the opposition 
between semiotics (in the lines of Charles Sanders Peirce and 
Ferdinand de Saussure) that deals with algorithmized semiotic rules, 
and hermeneutics, according to which the interpretation arises at the 
reference to the texts constructed according to non-algorithmized 
semiotic rules. Accordingly, on the same basis, it is possible to oppose 
biosemiotics to biohermeneutics6. In private discussions and cor-
respondence with the author, we have reached a full mutual under-
standing on this question. However, there are some terminological 
complications here.  
The problem is that the central category used by Witzany is “com-
munication”. First of all, “communication” is a tool for data transmis-
sion. The opposite of communication in this aspect is “communion” 
(compare Greek koinonia) — personal interaction, that is not only 
utilitarian, but also valuable in itself. Then it would be possible to 
present a relationship of the basic concepts by the following table: 
 






                                                 
6   Nevertheless, Günther Witzany refrains from the opposition, preferring to 
speak about three-level biosemiotics (see LB1) in order not to enter in discus-
sions on the ontological problems connected with hermeneutics. 
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English “communication” can be opposed to a considerable degree to 
“communion” which can designate the sacrament of communion as 
well. In that case all the concepts developed by Witzany would have a 
clear terminological structure. A lack of this categorical network is 
why it looks very much anthropomorphic. This was the reason why 
the reviewer (Chebanov 1995) has introduced the term “enlogue” for 
the designation of interaction like communion between any items (not 
only between reasoning persons), which has been favorably accepted 
by Witzany too. 
However, in private correspondence Günther Witzany emphasizes 
that communication in Jürgen Habermas’ (1984, 1987) understanding 
cannot in principle be understood as defined only by algorithmic 
rules7. That is obvious when we deal with the question of interaction 
between the artificial languages of science and the language of daily 
dialogue. Similarly, Karl Jaspers and Karl-Otto Apel understand com-
munication in a non-algorithmic way (LB2: 200–202; Witzany studied 
hermeneutics under Karl-Otto Apel). 
In this point, it would seem that everything is clear and there is 
nothing left to disagree with. However, I think that this is not comple-
tely true. Actively working experts could probably understand what is 
the subject under the discussion, but it is doubtful that an ordinary 
reader could make this analysis. 
From the reviewer’s point of view, the construction discussed 
above is the most important part — the conceptual kernel — of G. 
Witzany’s two-volume work, owing to which it reaches the status of a 
new stage of development in biosemiotics. And its concrete descriptive 
part is no less fascinating. 
Having laid out the new conceptual construction, there only re-
mains the task of tracking this construction in various empirical areas 
of the discussed subject. This is exactly what Günther Witzany does. 
Thus main significance of LB2 lays in the consideration how the 
proclaimed principles work in concrete sections of biosemiotic work, 
                                                 
7   The structure of this book served as a model for the two volumes by 
Günther Witzany discussed in the present review. 
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as they are manifested in different groups of organisms (in the four 
kingdoms of organisms — in plants, pp.19–56; fungi, 57–84; animals, 
85–118; and bacteria,  119–150; but also in viruses — pp. 151–182). 
Witzany performs the biosemiotic categorization of a great volume of 
the newest empirical material in order to build the system of bio-
semiotics. 
 The table of fig. 1 (LB2: 11) acts as a structural basis for this system. 
It describes the forms of communication of prokaryotes, protocists, 
animals, fungi, plants and human beings on intra-, inter- and meta-
organismic (interspecific) levels with a special attention to semantics, 
syntactics and the pragmatics of interaction.  
It is necessary to note at once, that the specified sections divided on 
taxonomic principle are characterized by a considerable volume, fair 
thoroughness, methodical regularity (manifested in the parallelism of 
subsections, the consideration of similar schemes, the repeating struc-
ture of the argumentation). This definitely increases the argumentative 
persuasiveness of the work, but it gives some ponderousness to the 
book and, for example the present reviewer as an author would never 
dare to go such a way.  
At the same time, each section has some findings by the author, 
which give additional appeal to the book as a whole. Thus, in section 1, 
Plant communication from biosemiotic perspective, the communication 
of plants is treated as their reaction to the influence of various sig-
nals — abiotic and biotic — and different languages of such communi-
cation are considered. In this aspect auxin acts depending on the 
context as a hormone, morphogen or neurotransmitter (LB2: 23). The 
dictionary of chemical language includes secondary metabolites, 
neurotransmitters, hormones, etc. (LB2: 24–25). Different levels of 
interaction of plants are analyzed in a similar way. 
Perhaps the most valuable in this section is the attention paid to 
the root apex (LB2: 21, 23, 35–37) which functions comparably to the 
brain of animals (see, e.g., Frantisek Baluska’s works – Baluska 2006; 
LB2: 23, 27, 36), and drawing the attention of biosemioticians to this 
material. 
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Section 2, Fungal Communication, is of special interest because the 
author is mycologist for his narrower biological specialty. It gives the 
chance to him to consider a wide range of rather specific questions 
from the biosemiotics point of view, all of them interesting pheno-
mena from the point of view of general biology: for example, lichens 
(LB2: 63) and other kinds of fungal symbiosis (LB2: 63–67) as well as 
the semiotic aspects of infection of fungal mitochondria by double-
stranded RNA or DNA viruses (LB2: 75–77). 
According to the composition of the book, Section 3, Coral 
Communication, has to represent the three-level semiosis in animals. 
Such composition has turned out to be very successful for two reasons. 
First, having refused the claim to present all completeness of semiotics 
processes in animals, the author releases himself from the necessity to 
retell banality. Secondly, having chosen not simply corals, but the 
processes of communication during their morphogenesis, Witzany has 
an opportunity to discuss the newest data on this subject, which has 
become one of the models for molecular genetics of morphogenesis. 
Thus he pays special attention to the archaism of this group (LB2: 103) 
thanks to what the results obtained can be transferred on to a rather 
wide circle of more highly organized animals. 
Section 4, Communicative competences of bacteria, concentrates 
first of all on the claim that for bacteria the key characteristic is not 
unicellularity, but rather the formation of multilevel supercellular 
units — biofilms (LB2: 120–122) — connected to inter-level com-
munication and epigenetic relations (LB2: 121). Such statement forces 
us to pay special attention to different types of symbiotic relations 
between bacteria. Thus, the focus is not on the classical characteristics 
of bacteria as prokaryotes, but on the fact that the organization of their 
genetic systems defines the large role of horizontal transmission of the 
genetic material (LB2: 125–133) carried out by viruses (LB2: 134–135). 
Thus the viruses perform natural editing of the genome (LB2: 138–
141). 
The idea of natural editing of the genome is a basis for the two 
following sections of the book. Section 5 is specially devoted to the 
ability of viruses to perform natural editing of genomes, and Section 6 
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is devoted to a statement on the original theory of serial endo-
symbiogenesis (LB2: 188–199). The latter is some kind of a synthesis 
between popular representations about symbiogenesis by L. Margulis 
and the ideas of V. A. Kordjum about the role of viruses in global 
transmission of the genetic information by transduction on the basis 
of three-level biosemiosis. In this context it becomes clear why the 
author paid so much more attention to different types of symbiotic 
relations in the previous sections. 
The material discussed above allows us to assert that before us is a 
rather uncommon book which very clearly formulates indisputable 
basic principles of biosemiotics. Of special interest is the attempt to 
construct the system of biosemiotics which, as well as many other 
things in biology, is constructed on taxonomic principles. An additio-
nal appeal is given to the book by the inclusion of various very new 
empirical data. It is quite clear that a part of the interpretations is 
debatable. The idea of serial endosymbiogenesis is debatable, too. 
Nevertheless it gives completeness and symmetry for the whole con-






I approached the two books with a great expectation: I know Witzany 
as an enthusiastic propagator of a new view of life. 8 He developed a 
three-level model of communicative processes (intra-, inter-, and 
meta-organismic), as well as a system of syntactic, pragmatic, and 
semantic rules reigning the living. 
Browsing through both volumes reveals that they are not compiled 
as monographs: with the exception of two Introductions and one 
Epilogue they represent a collection of author’s previous works. Of 205 
pages of LB1, 85 comprise reprints of two chapters from his earlier 
                                                 
8   Witzany 2000; a translation of a German original published in 1993. This 
book is, to a great extent, a collection of author’s older papers. 
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book (Witzany 2000); the rest of LB1 is a collection of 6 papers 
published in various journals and proceedings in 1990s and 2000s, 
united only by the Introduction (11 pages). Of seven chapters of LB2 
only two were not published elsewhere. I do not criticize reprinting 
older works, even outdated, when the author states what is the 
objective of doing so. Here, however, the absence of comments or 
amalgamating text is quite a drawback:   
(i) No comments are given to anachronisms, especially concerning 
papers from the early 1990s. We read, e.g., about Vollmert’s theory 
from the 1980s on evolution driven by DNA prolongation, accom-
panied by emergence of new genes. Witzany of course must know that 
later achievements in genomics have not validated the theory, but 
makes no attempt to comment or correct on the reprint. 
(ii) Redundancy is very annoying throughout the reading, espe-
cially in LB2, where several chapters are built according to a common 
scheme, with almost identical diagrams in each. Obviously, reviews on 
plant, fungal, coral, bacterial, or virus-mediated communication, when 
published in different special journals, allow such a strategy, but piling 
them up in a single volume calls for an extensive editing. The same 
holds for many clichés: For example, a grievance that most biologists 
take non-coding DNA for “junk” (completely untrue in my opinion), 
became a mantra repeated over the texts. 
(iii) Technical language. If you send a review to, say, Plant Sig-
naling and Behavior, you will expect that its readers are in command 
of special terminology of plant sciences. No such expectation is 
allowed in a collection bringing together so many multifarious sub-
jects. Consequently, a glossary of basic concepts should be an obvious 
part of both volumes, especially when taking into consideration the 
specific style of the author, as will be discussed below. 
 
This mosaic character of the collection is in a fractal-like manner 
retained also at the level of texts proper. Often paragraphs follow each 
other without any link-up; and even sentences in a single paragraph 
follow each other without any clear context, as if copied and pasted 
from different resources they refer to. Moreover, very often the reader 
Sergey V. Chebanov, Anton Markoš  340
has an impression that there is no feeling for different levels of 
knowledge: banal textbook truths and concepts are served intermixed 
with very special factography — even within a single paragraph — 
with each sentence furnished copiously with a reference to some 
article or book. Peculiar is also the selection of references. Of course, 
the author has the right to choose any work in support of his point, 
but it should be clear that he knows also the mainstream views, and he 
should give reasons why he prefers the alternatives. For example, when 
speaking of endosymbiotic theory, he keeps referring to (somewhat 
outdated) views of Lynn Margulis, but no reference is given to more 
recent and well-elaborated mainstream research.  
To support my not very amiable statements, I give below a closer 
parsing of Chapter 5 from LB2. It starts with very ambitious state-
ments (my italics): 
 
It is becoming increasingly evident that the driving forces of evolutio-
nary novelty are not randomly derived chance mutations of the genetic 
text, but a precise genome editing by omnipresent viral agents. [...] Non-
coding, repetitive DNA sequences [...] are now recognized as being of 
viral descent and crucial for higher-order regulatory and constitutional 
functions of protein structural vocabulary. (Witzany 2007: 151) 
 
The author argues that this editing proceeds according to 3-step com-
petences (syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic) which are characteristic 
for viral particles. The abstract of the chapter ends with the statement:  
 
There is growing evidence that natural genome-editing competences of 
viruses are essential (1.) for the evolution of the eukaryotic nucleus (2.) 
the adaptive immune system and (3.) the placental mammals. (Witzany 
2007: 151–152) 
 
The reference list of the article contains 75 items, my counting says 
that there are 140 in-text links. Out of these, however, 60 refer to two 
works only: one book and one paper (a review on the same topic) by 
Luis P. Villarreal; hence, most crucial statements rely to this single 
author.  
A text on biosemiotic themes  341
We get a short introduction about non-coding DNA in eukaryotes, 
and come to part 2 discussing the role of non-coding regulatory net-
works in the genome. I give an illustrative paragraph (sentence 
numbering is mine, number of references in square brackets): 
 
[1] Clearly, mobile sequences such as transposons and retroposons[ref] 
and non-coding repetitive elements […] enable far-reaching DNA 
rearrangement and reorganization[4 refs]. [2] Together, they play a 
decisive role in the evolution of new genomic structures[4 refs]. [3] 
Depending on the organism’s state of development, the varying 
chromatin markers are, thus capable — through different methylation 
patterns, histone modifications and alternative splicing — of creating a 
set of “multiple protein meanings”[ref] from one and the same genetic 
data-set[8 refs]. [4] This even characterizes the rise of epigenetics, i.e. the 
view that phenotypic variations, which are heritable, need not be 
connected with genetic alterations[5 refs]. [5] The question arises as to how 
and why the evolution of higher genetic complexity is connected to non-
coding DNA, formerly termed “junk”-DNA? (Witzany 2007: 153) 
 
If you take first three sentences separately, they are true; but how does 
the sentence (3) follow from the first two? Does it suggest that chro-
matin markers arose by genome rearrangement and reorganization? 
What are those elusive chromatin markers? What I took for chromatin 
markers, i.e.  “different methylation patterns, histone modifications 
and alternative splicing” are here but epiphenomena of true markers. 
How such markers create “multiple protein meanings”? I supposed 
that such meanings are given by previous history of the cell body and 
the state of protein “ecosystem” in it. Epigenetic states create them-
selves, they are not created genetically — after all that is why they have 
got their name. The sentence (4) makes little sense: epigenetics is not a 
view, and “the view that phenotypic variations, which are heritable, 
need not be connected with genetic alterations” is more than one 
century old, thus does not follow from the knowledge of trans-
positions. The last sentence suddenly introduces yet another motif: it 
takes us from the realm of ontogeny into evolutionary processes.  
Enough of illustrations; the reader can continue with the following 
paragraph, which connects “enzyme proteins” with DNA editing as 
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tools for — actually, what?; continues with the list of processes in 
chromatin; with Watson allegedly inventing in 1992 what was already 
a textbook knowledge at that time; up to “linguistic features of non-
coding DNA”. The section ends with a statement that “natural genetic 
engineering” is different from “artificial” one, because “The former 
provides ontologically genuine products that are evident in all living 
beings and life processes, whereas the latter attempts to achieve modi-
fications and improvements by copying the natural genome-editing 
competences” (Witzany 2007: 155). What have we learnt so far?  
Part 3 of the same chapter — ‘Major viral life-strategies’ (pp. 155–
158) — relies almost completely on the above-mentioned works by 
Villarreal. Again, we get sudden jumps from retroviral (and their 
derivative) composition of human genome, to virus abundance in the 
ocean water, to general information about viral types and the strategy 
of their reproduction. We learn that “viruses can parasitize almost any 
replication system — even prebiotic ones — and probably emerged 
well before the appearance of cellular life forms” (?), yet “most viruses, 
however, are stable, persistent living beings that do not colonize a host 
organism for simple selfish purposes” (Witzany 2007: 156, 157). The 
term fitness must be modified, on the base of the statement that “The 
fact that viruses are silent companions of virtually all organisms and 
that they play a decisive role in the evolution of the host has been 
largely ignored” (Witzany 2007: 157–158). 
I skip analyzing part 4 on strategic patterns of viruses — I simply 
cannot understand it — and move to part 5: ‘Pre-cellular viral life’. 
Somehow I did not get any information of how could viruses endure 
in a world without cells; instead I read about “RNA proteins”, “DNA 
transaction proteins”, “DNA viruses infecting RNA viruses”. We move 
now to the main body of the text, consisting of parts 6, ‘The origin of 
eukaryotic nucleus’; 7, ‘The origin of the adaptive immune system’; 8, 
‘The evolutionary innovation of placental mammals through endo-
genous retroviruses’. From reading these parts I understand that L. 
P. Villareal is of opinion that retroviruses are responsible for all that, 
and that Witzany agrees with him. But this is a summary — the text 
itself will not allow such conclusions. 
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I know Günther Witzany personally and know that our views are 
very close. I also emphasise the semiotic and hermeneutic nature of 
life, of which contemporary biology is but one possible projection. Yet 
I feel that uncritical piling of biological facts is not the way to persuade 
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